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INTRODUCTION
Earl Washington Jr., a black mentally retarded farmhand, spent
seventeen years in prison-nearly ten of them on death row-for
the rape and murder of a white woman before DNA tests linked
another man to the crimes. 'The evidence originally implicating him
was questionable. The victim provided little identifying informa-
tion, indicating before her death only that a black man had attacked
her.' Washington was convicted based largely on his own confes-
sion, even though he simultaneously provided factually inconsistent
confessions to four other crimes and did not know the location of the
crime scene, whether other people were present, or even the
victim's race without the assistance of leading questioning from
police.3 When defense counsel sought postconviction relief based on
the discovery of another man's DNA on a blanket linked to the
crime, prosecutors resisted.4 Even after Washington was pardoned
because of exonerating evidence, prosecutors insisted that he
remained a viable suspect.5
1. Maria Glod, DNA Not Enough To Charge Va. Rapist: Authorities Kept Identity a
Secret, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at B4.
2. Id.
3. Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1478 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting the
questionable circumstances surrounding Washington's interrogation); Eric M. Freedman,
Earl Washington's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1089, 1091-94 (2001) (detailing the history
of the Washington "confessions").
4. See Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Editorial,
Justice Begrudged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at A14 (advocating "an honest vetting of the
judicial process that allowed (Washington's] name to be sullied in the first place").
5. See Glod, supra note 1 ("There are several people who are potential suspects, and I
cannot rule out Earl Washington." (quoting prosecuting attorney)). The current county
prosecutor, who assumed office after Washington was convicted, was perhaps even more
insistent about his guilt, telling a local paper after Washington's exoneration, "It has been
my position all along that Earl Washington is guilty, and that is still my position." Complaint
117, Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 692 (W.D. Va. 2004) (No. 3:02-CV-00106)
(civil suit filed by Earl Washington against several Virginia officials); see also MARGARET
EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. 181 (2003) ("No
one, it seemed, was more convinced of Washington's guilt than [the county's prosecuting
attorney]."). Washington's civil suit is still pending. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d
274,275-76 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's denial of summary judgment on one
of Washington's claims).
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Earl Washington's case raises questions about the discretionary
decisions his prosecutors made from the moment they received the
case. Why did they look past apparent problems with the confes-
sion? Why did they resist the evidentiary testing that ultimately
exonerated an innocent man? Why would they still not concede
innocence after his exoneration? Traditionally, commentators have
clothed the study of prosecutorial decision making in the rhetoric
of fault, attributing normatively inappropriate outcomes to bad
prosecutorial intentions and widespread prosecutorial misconduct.6
From this perspective, Earl Washington's conviction, and his
prosecutors' refusal to concede his innocence even after a guberna-
torial pardon, result from prosecutorial overzealousness, v a culture
that emphasizes winning,8 the absence of "moral courage,"' and the
failure of prosecutors to act as neutral advocates of justice.'0
6. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 890 (1995)
("Prosecutorial misconduct is readily apparent to any lawyer who keeps abreast of appellate
review of criminal convictions.").
7. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework,
15 AM. J. CRIm. L. 197, 204-13 (1988) (describing factors that cause prosecutors to pursue
cases "overzealously"); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393,
458 (1992) (arguing that "the present ethos of overzealous prosecutorial advocacy" is
"ingrained"); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit of Justice" in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2002) (noting that "[o]verzealous prosecutors may become too
closely aligned with ... witnesses who are willing to shade or falsify their testimony in order
to obtain a conviction").
8. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial7: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (decrying prosecutors who "keep
personal tallies ... for self-promotion"); Meares, supra note 6, at 882 (describing the "desire
to 'win" as "a central characteristic of prosecutorial culture"); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal
Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125,
134 (2004) (attributing the lack of prosecutorial support for postconviction claims of
innocence in part to "the emphasis district attorneys' offices place on conviction rates").
9. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309,
350 (2001); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1242-45 (1999)
(discussing prosecutorial discretion guided by "moral norms"); Bruce A. Green, The Role of
Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 59-60 (1997)
(advocating ad hoc invocation of moral judgment).
10. Prosecutors are not only obligated to act as advocates to enforce the law but are also
entrusted to ensure that justice is met. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1
(2001) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an
advocate."); cf Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 792-94 (2000)
(discussing the public interests served by prosecutors).
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This focus upon incentives, priorities, and values as potential
taints upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion reveals an
implicit but important assumption about prosecutors: they are
rational, utility-maximizing decision makers. Prosecutors choose to
overcharge defendants, withhold exculpatory evidence, and turn a
blind eye to claims of innocence; therefore, the traditional inference
goes, they must value obtaining and maintaining convictions over
"doing justice."" To ensure that prosecutors do not rationally opt for
misconduct to maximize their conviction rates, the fault-based
literature recommends reform through changes to the prosecutorial
cost-benefit analysis. Common strategies include more stringent
ethical rules,'2 increased disciplinary proceedings and sanctions
against prosecutors, 3 and professional 4 and financial"6 rewards
based on factors other than just obtaining convictions.
Consider, however, a different explanation for the failure of
prosecutors always to make just decisions. Perhaps prosecutors
sometimes fail to make decisions that rationally further justice, not
because they fail to value justice, but because they are, in fact,
irrational. They are irrational because they are human, and all
human decision makers share a common set of information-
processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality. A
11. See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors 'Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 636 (1999) (emphasizing a prosecutor's unique "duty to avoid the public
perception that criminal proceedings are unfair"); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics
of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 107-09
(1991) (describing the psychological factors that limit the effectiveness of "do justice"
provisions).
12. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587.
13. Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case
Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 887,889 (1998) (noting an "absence
of disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases"); Fred C.
Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) (assessing
the lack of discipline for prosecutorial misconduct).
14. Berenson, supra note 10, at 846 (recommending that professional advancement in
prosecutors' offices "should be based on richer measures of compliance with the 'do justice'
standard, rather than simply on conviction rates"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of
Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 305,320-21(2001) (suggesting that prosecutors be rewarded with promotion opportunities
for identifying police misconduct); Medwed, supra note 8, at 172 (advocating incentives for
prosecutors to respond to postconviction claims of innocence).
15. Meares, supra note 6, at 873-74 (proposing the reduction of overcharging by
rewarding prosecutors financially for obtaining convictions on charges initially pursued).
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compelling body of cognitive research demonstrates that people
systematically hold a set of cognitive biases, rendering them neither
perfectly rational information processors, nor wholly random or
irrational decision makers.'" Drawing on the cognitive literature,
the growing literature of behavioral law and economics explores
the limitations of cost-benefit rationality, challenging the assump-
tion of traditional economists that people are perfect wealth
maximizers. 7 From both the cognitive and behavioral economics
literature emerges a theory of bounded rationality that seeks to
explain how cognitive biases and limitations in our cognitive
abilities distort perfect information processing in nonrandom,
predictable ways.'"
16. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211-63 (1999);
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 17-42 (1980); STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 175 (1997); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1997) (noting
that although "[clognitive errors ... may press behavior far from the anticipated directions,"
human decision making is not "unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free,
or elusive to social scientists"). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS
TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
17. Traditional law and economics assumes that actors make utility-maximizing
decisions about their behavior, weighing with perfect rationality the benefits of a behavior
against its costs, assessed by the likely sanction and probability of detection. See, e.g., A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-78 (2d ed. 1989).
18. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000); Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and
Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1594-96 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2000). For example, reliance on the "availability heuristic" causes
people to overestimate the occurrence of events that are easily imagined. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). As a result, they may be more fearful of and more
willing to devote resources to prevent highly salient and unlikely occurrences, such as
airplane crashes, than less salient and more likely events, such as automobile accidents. See
generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999). Similarly, the "endowment effect" describes the overvaluation
of property that is already owned, which can distort efficient bargaining. See generally
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232-
35 (2003).
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Others have suggested how cognitive bias and bounded rational-
ity can affect juries,19 judges,2" the regulation of risk,2 federal
rulemaking, 2  corporate disclosures, 23 contract law, 24 consumer
choice,25 employment discrimination,26 and group deliberations.27
This Article seeks to explain how cognitive bias can affect the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Viewing cases like Earl
Washington's through a lens of human cognition, rather than fault,
colors not only the description of the problem, but also the recom-
mended solutions. When the underlying problem is human irratio-
nality, rather than the malicious intentions of a single prosecutor
or the indifference of a prosecutorial culture, the result is a far more
complicated story about the criminal justice system. If prosecutors
fail to achieve justice not because they are bad, but because they
are human, what hope is there for change?
19. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff& Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects ofJury Ignorance About
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1375-88 (2005)
(discussing the effects on jury decision making of disclosing the cap on jury awards); Saul M.
Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 687, 697
(1990) (noting that cautionary instructions and cross-examination may not cure damage of
misleading witness testimony because early impressions are resistant to change); Edward
J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards,
81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1354-73 (1995) (considering how the use of cognitive theory in the
framing ofjury instructions can affect monetary awards for pain and suffering).
20. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
121-23 (1998).
21. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 711-23.
22. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 620-30 (2002).
23. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:A Behavioral Theory ofWhy Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101,130-
48 (1997).
24. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 225-58 (1995).
25. Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology, Consumer
Behavior and Consumer Law, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 69, 71 (1990).
26. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-217
(1995).
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 88-90 (2000).
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This Article explores the potential that even "virtuous,"28
"conscientious,"29 and "prudent" ° prosecutors fall prey to cognitive
failures. Part I summarizes four related aspects of cognitive bias
that can affect theory formation and maintenance. Part II explores
how these cognitive phenomena might adversely affect the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, Part III proposes a series of
reforms that might improve the quality of prosecutorial decision
making, despite the limitations of human cognition.
I. COGNITIVE BIAS: FOUR EXAMPLES OF IMPERFECT
DECISION MAKING
Decades of empirical research demonstrate that people's beliefs
are both imperfect and resistant to change. Once people form
theories, they fail to adjust the strength of their beliefs when
confronted with evidence that challenges the accuracy of those
theories.3' Indeed, theory maintenance will often hold even when
people learn that the evidence that originally justified the theory is
inaccurate.32 At the same time that people fail to consider informa-
tion that disconfirms a theory, they tend both to seek out and to
overvalue information that confirms it. 33
This Article explores four related but separate aspects of
cognitive bias that can contribute to imperfect theory formation and
maintenance: confirmation bias, selective information processing,
'belief perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek to confirm, rather than
28. H. Richard Uviller, Commentary, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH.L.REV. 1145,1155-59 (1973) (discussing ethical
problems unique to prosecutors).
29. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICs 219 (1990) (speaking of
the charging obligations of "conscientious prosecutors").
30. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261 (2001)
(discussing the moral and legal discretion held by prosecutors in performing their jobs).
31. NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 16, at 169.
32. Id.
33. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr.,
Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202
(1978).
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disconfirm, any hypothesis under study. 4 Selective information
processing causes people to overvalue information that is consistent
with their preexisting theories and to undervalue information that
challenges those theories.3" Belief perseverance refers to the human
tendency to continue to adhere to a theory, even after the evidence
underlying the theory is disproved. 36 Finally, the desire to avoid
cognitive dissonance can cause people to adjust their beliefs to
maintain existing self-perceptions.3 7 This Part summarizes the
empirical literature regarding each of these cognitive phenomena.
A. Confirmation Bias
When testing a hypothesis's validity, people tend to favor
information that confirms their theory over disconfirming informa-
tion. 8 Good evidence suggests that this information-seeking bias
results because people tend to recognize the relevance of confirming
evidence more than disconfirming evidence.3 9 This is true even
when an effort to disconfirm is an essential step towards confirma-
tion of the hypothesis under test.
For example, in a classic study of confirmation bias in hypothesis
testing, Peter Wason presented subjects with four cards and told
them that each card contained a letter on one side and a number on
the other.4' The revealed sides of the four cards displayed one
vowel, one consonant, one even number, and one odd number.41
Subjects were then asked which of the four cards needed to be
34. See infra Part I.A.
35. See infra Part I.B.
36. See infra Part I.C.
37. See infra Part I.D.
38. P. C. WASON & P. N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING: STRUCTURE AND
CONTENT 210-11 (1972).
39. Id. at 202-17; see also KUNDA, supra note 39, at 112-17 (describing hypothesis
confirmation when evaluating other people); Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha,
Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV.
211 (1987) (arguing that confirmation bias is better understood as a positive test strategy).
40. P. C. Wason, Reasoning About a Rule, 20 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 273, 273
(1968).
41. Id.
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turned over to test the following rule: If a card has a vowel on one
side, then it has an even number on the other side.42
Proper scientific method requires that researchers seek to
disprove their working hypotheses.43 Accordingly, the rational test
of Wason's "if vowel, then even number" card test is to turn over the
vowel and odd number cards. The vowel card provides a relevant
test because discovery of an odd number on its backside would
disprove the tested rule. The odd number card provides an equally
relevant test because the discovery of a vowel on the backside of the
odd number card would disconfirm the proposed "if vowel, then
even number" rule in the same way as any odd number on the other
side of the vowel card.
However, to test the rule that all vowel cards had even numbers
on the other side, subjects overwhelmingly selected from their four
choices either just the vowel card, or the vowel and the even
number cards.' They failed to select the odd number card that was
necessary to test the rule properly.4" Moreover, subjects who chose
the even number card erred still further because that card's
backside offered no probative value to the rule at hand.46 The
subjects' choice of cards demonstrated that the subjects failed to
recognize the importance of disconfirming evidence and instead
sought information that would tend to confirm the working rule.4"
In another classic study, Mark Snyder and William Swann
replicated confirmation bias in the context of social inference.48
Subjects were asked to select questions from a list for the purpose
of interviewing a target person.49 Half of the subjects were in-
structed to choose questions that would test whether the target
person was an extrovert, and half were told to test whether the
42. Id. at 273-75.
43. See generally KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 32-33 (1968).
44. Wason, supra note 40, at 273-77.
45. Id. at 276-77.
46. Id. at 280-81. To discover a vowel on the other side of the even number card would
simply provide an example consistent with the "ifvowel, then even number" rule. However,
to discover a consonant on the other side would do nothing to disprove the "if vowel, then
even number" rule, which says nothing about the reverse side of consonant cards. Id. at 280.
47. Id.
48. Snyder & Swann, supra note 33, at 1202.
49. Id. at 1203.
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target person was an introvert.50 The results demonstrated a strong
confirmation bias.5 Subjects selected questions that could only
prove, and never disprove, their working hypothesis .52 For example,
subjects testing for extroversion chose questions like "What would
you do if you wanted to liven things up at a party?," while subjects
testing for introversion chose questions like "In what situations do
you wish you could be more outgoing?"53
The social science literature suggests that people demonstrate
confirmation bias not only in seeking new information, but also in
the recollection of stored information. In one study, subjects were
given the same list of traits about a woman named Jane.54 Some of
the listed traits were characteristic of extroversion, some of
introversion, and others neutral.55 Two days later, subjects were
asked to determine Jane's suitability for a job either as a real estate
agent or as a librarian.56 Even though all subjects were exposed to
the same information about Jane, those subjects testing Jane's
suitability for real estate work tended to recall more extroverted
than introverted facts about her, whereas the reverse was true for
subjects testing her suitability as a librarian.57 The researchers
concluded that subjects were searching their memories in a biased
manner, preferring information that tended to confirm the hypothe-
sis presented.58
B. Selective Information Processing
A good deal of empirical research demonstrates that people are
incapable of evaluating the strength of evidence independent of
their prior beliefs. People not only demonstrate search and recall
preferences for information that tends to confirm their preexisting
50. Id. at 1203-04.
51. Id. at 1202-12.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1204.
54. See Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Testing Hypotheses About Other People: The Use
of Historical Knowledge, 15 J. ExPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 330 (1979).
55. Id. at 330-33.
56. Id. at 333.
57. Id. at 334-35.
58. Id. at 341-42.
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theories, they also tend to devalue disconfirming evidence, even
when presented with it. As a result of selective information pro-
cessing, people weigh evidence that supports their prior beliefs
more heavily than evidence that contradicts their beliefs.
Charles Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper conducted what is
perhaps the most well-known study demonstrating this bias against
disconfirmation.59 Based on prior questioning, the researchers knew
that half of their subjects were proponents of the death penalty who
believed that the death penalty deterred murder, while the other
half were opponents who did not believe that the death penalty
deterred.6 ° Subjects were asked to evaluate two studies, one that
supported a deterrent efficacy of the death penalty, and one that
suggested the death penalty's inefficacy as a deterrent.61 The
researchers found that proponents of the death penalty judged the
prodeterrence study as more convincing than the nondeterrence
study, whereas opponents of the death penalty reached the
opposite conclusion." Even though the studies described the same
experimental procedures but with differing results, subjects
articulated detailed justifications to support their conclusion that
the study supporting their preexisting view was superior.63
Moreover, as a result of the biased evaluation of the two studies,
subjects became more polarized in their beliefs. In other words,
even though all subjects read two contradictory studies on the death
penalty, proponents of the death penalty reported that they were
more in favor of capital punishment after reading the studies, while
opponents reported that they were less in favor.'
Other researchers have replicated the phenomenon of selective
information processing in a variety of contexts. Social scientists
59. Lord, Ross & Lepper, supra note 33, at 2098.
60. Id. at 2100.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2101-02.
63. Id. at 2103.
64. Id. at 2103-04.
65. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Argument Availability as a Mediator of Social
Theory Perseverance, 3 SOC. COGNITION 235,244-48 (1985) (argument availability); Peter H.
Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for
Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992)
(information evaluation); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the
Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1996) (argument
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have suggested that the mechanism for selective information
processing is attributable at least in part to motivational factors.66
As an initial matter, people choose to expose themselves to
information that is consonant with their beliefs rather than
dissonant.6 7 Moreover, when exposed to dissonant information, they
are motivated to defend their beliefs, giving more attention and
heightened scrutiny to information that challenges those beliefs.8
They will search internally for material that refutes the
disconfirming evidence, and, once that material is retrieved from
memory, a bias will exist to judge the disconfirming evidence as
weak." In contrast, when presented with information that supports
evaluation); Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the Opposite:
A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984)
(social judgment); Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of
Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude
Change, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 563-64 (1993) (attitude polarization among
research participants with a broad range of preexisting attitudes); Geoffrey D. Munro &
Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reactions to
Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636
(1997) (biased assimilation and attitude polarization in the processing of stereotype-relevant
scientific information); Norbert Schwarz et al., Interactive Effects of Writing and Reading a
Persuasive Essay on Attitude Change and Selective Exposure, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 5-9 (1980) (reporting that subjects found sample letters to the editor more
convincing and less biased when the letters supported their own positions). But see Miller et
al., supra, at 561-69 (replicating the study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper, but finding no attitude
polarization when subjects' positions were directly assessed by asking the same questions
presented prior to the administration of the opposing studies).
66. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 493-95
(1990); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and
Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, in 20
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 297, 333 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1987);
Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg & Kathleen Holt, Maintaining Consistency Between Self-
Serving Beliefs and Available Data: A Bias in Information Evaluation, 11 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 179, 186-88 (1985).
67. See Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg & John LaPrelle, Social Comparison After
Success and Failure: Biased Search for Information Consistent with a Self-Serving
Conclusion, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 206-11 (1985) ("In both studies failure
subjects showed a high level of interest in acquiring additional information when they
expected it to reveal that most other students performed poorly and very little interest in
acquiring additional information when they expected it to reveal that most others performed
well.").
68. See Ditto & Lopez, supra note 65, at 580-82 (suggesting a mechanism by which
motivational factors affect judgment processes); Edwards & Smith, supra note 65, at 18
(summarizing the values that supposedly underlie the motivation to defend prior beliefs).
69. See Edwards & Smith, supra note 65, at 18 (proposing a model to account for
disconfirmation bias).
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prior beliefs, people allocate fewer resources to scrutinizing the
information and are more inclined to accept the information at face
value.7"
At a general level, selective information processing may be
normatively rational.7 When new information is compatible with
what we already know, it is probably accurate. Careful scrutiny
and a search for contradictory material would expend cognitive
resources unnecessarily.72 On the other hand, information that is
incompatible with existing information may be fallacious, and
cognitive work to reveal the fallacy is well spent.73 Of course,
disconfirmation bias leads to effective decision making only when
the prior beliefs that bias the assimilation of new information are
themselves supported by accurate information.74 In criminal cases,
prosecutors enjoy no such guarantee, potentially basing their
theories of guilt on retracted confessions, flawed eyewitness
testimony, and false testimony from jailhouse informants.75
C. Belief Perseverance
Although selective information processing can prevent rational,
incremental adjustments in response to new information, the
phenomenon of belief perseverance describes the tendency to
adhere to theories even when new information wholly discredits
the theory's evidentiary basis. With belief perseverance, human
cognition departs from perfectly rational decision making not
through biased assimilation of ambiguous new information, but by
failing to adjust beliefs in response to proof that prior information
was demonstrably false.
70. Id.
71. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 16, at 171 (addressing the normative status of
disconfirmation bias); Edwards & Smith, supra note 65, at 22 (same).
72. Edwards & Smith, supra note 65, at 22.
73. Id.
74. NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 16, at 171.
75. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 801, 822-25 (2004) (discussing sources of wrongful
convictions); Stanley Z. Fisher & Ian McKenzie, A Miscarriage of Justice in Massachusetts:
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, Unrecorded Admissions, and a Comparison with
English Law, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 3-15 (2003) (same).
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In a well-known experiment by Lee Ross, Mark Lepper, and
Michael Hubbard, subjects were asked to discern between fake and
actual suicide notes.76 By manipulating false feedback given to
subjects as they performed the dummy task, the experimenters
led subjects to believe that they had average performance, above
average performance (success condition), or below average perfor-
mance (failure condition).77 Following their completion of the task,
subjects were fully debriefed and learned that the feedback had
been false, predetermined, and random.7" Subjects were even shown
the experimenters' instruction sheet, which preassigned subjects to
each of the three performance conditions and stipulated the
corresponding feedback to be delivered.79
After subjects were debriefed, they were asked to assess their
actual performance on the task, to estimate the average perfor-
mance, and to predict their probable performance if they were to
repeat the task. ° The researchers found considerable belief
perseverance among subjects, despite the debriefing. Subjects
assigned the "success condition" rated both their actual and future
task performance more favorably than other subjects, while subjects
assigned the "failure condition" showed the opposite pattern,
continuing to rate their performance unfavorably."1
Moreover, the study found that belief perseverance was not
limited to self-evaluation, but extended to perceptions of others.
Observer subjects who watched both the feedback sessions and the
subsequent debriefings from behind a one-way glass also continued
to demonstrate belief perseverance after the debriefings.8 2 In other
words, observers tended to maintain their beliefs about the
observed subject's ability to distinguish between fake and actual
suicide notes, even after learning that the feedback was false. 3
76. Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and
Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 882 (1975).
77. Id. at 882-83.
78. Id. at 883.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 883-84.
82. Id. at 884-87.
83. Id.
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Similarly, in another study, Anderson, Lepper, and Ross
presented subjects with purportedly authentic histories of
firefighters and asked the subjects to write an explanation of the
relationship between risk preference and firefighting abilities
observed in the case histories.' By manipulating the case histories,
the experimenters led subjects to perceive either a positive or
negative correlation between the two traits."5 The researchers
reported that, even after subjects were debriefed concerning the
fictitious nature of the case histories, they continued to cling to
the theories they formed from those histories.8 In other words,
the subjects adhered to their conclusions, even after the evi-
dence underlying the conclusions was wholly discredited. As the
researchers concluded, "[ilnitial beliefs may persevere in the face
of a subsequent invalidation of the evidence on which they are
based, even when this initial evidence is itself ... weak.""
D. The Avoidance of Cognitive Dissonance
Another phenomenon that can affect prosecutorial cognition is
the desire to find consistency between one's behavior and beliefs.
The social science evidence suggests that inconsistency between
one's external behavior and internal beliefs creates an uncomfort-
able cognitive dissonance. To mitigate the dissonance, people will
adjust their beliefs in a direction consistent with their behavior.8
For example, in a classic study, Leon Festinger and James
Carlsmith paid subjects either one or twenty dollars to misinform
another person, a confederate who was supposedly waiting to serve
as a subject, that a long, boring task was actually interesting.8 9
84. Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The
Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1039-40 (1980).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1040-42.
87. Id. at 1045.
88. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957)
(explaining that individuals seek to reduce dissonance and achieve consonance between their
beliefs and behavior, and that individuals will often avoid situations that give rise to
dissonance).
89. Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance,
58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 204-07 (1959).
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Even though subjects were all required to complete the same
mundane task, the subjects who were paid only a dollar to deceive
the confederate reported that they found the task more interesting
than either the subjects who received the more substantial payment
or the control subjects, who had performed the task but had not
been asked to deceive the confederate. 90
The researchers concluded that cognitive dissonance was created
by the conflict between the subjects' beliefs that the task was boring
and the subjects' behavior in telling someone that the task was
interesting.91 To reconcile this dissonance, subjects who were paid
only a dollar to mislead adjusted their own beliefs about the task.92
In contrast, those who were paid twenty dollars had an additional
consonant cognition-"I was paid twenty dollars to lie"-and
therefore had no need to adjust their beliefs to be consistent with
their conduct.93 Since Fester and Carlsmith's original study, other
researchers have reported robust effects of cognitive dissonance in
other settings.94
II. THE ETHICAL PROSECUTOR AND COGNITIVE BIAS
No reason exists to believe that lawyers are immune from the
documented bounds of rationality, and yet the literature on
prosecutorial decision making continues to describe prosecutors as
rational, wealth-maximizing actors who would make better, more
just decisions if they only had better, more just values. 95 Through
the lens of the cognitive phenomena summarized in Part I, a more
90. Id. at 207-08.
91. Id. at 209-10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 73-92 (3d ed. 1993)
(stating that people are more likely to agree to substantial requests after first agreeing to
small ones); Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for
a Group, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 177-81 (1959) (reporting that subjects who
were required to undergo an embarrassing initiation to join a group subsequently evaluated
the group as more interesting than did control subjects); Robert E. Knox & James A. Inkster,
Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 319 (1968)
(finding that racetrack bettors upgraded the likelihood of their horses winning after placing
a bet).
95. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
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complicated story is evident. That prosecutors should be moti-
vated by justice, not conviction rates, should go without saying.
The harder question to answer is whether good motives, both
individually and institutionally, are enough. The implications of
the cognitive literature suggest not.
The broad powers of the prosecutor are familiar. If brought into
an investigation prior to a suspect's arrest, prosecutors can shape
the investigation's direction and scope by, for example, determining
whom to investigate and through what tactics.96 Once an arrest is
made, the prosecutor's full powers come into play as she determines
whether to bring charges, what charges to bring, whether to drop
charges once brought, whether to negotiate a plea and under what
terms, whether to grant immunity, and what sentence to seek upon
conviction." This Part explores some of the potential ways that
cognitive bias may taint the decision making of even ethical
prosecutors when executing this broad discretion.
A. Investigation and Charging Decisions
The potential for cognitive bias to creep into prosecutorial
decision making starts from the earliest case-screening stages,
when prosecutors must determine whether sufficient evidence
exists to proceed with a prosecution. In hypothesis testing terms,
they are testing the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty.98 The
phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural tendency to
review the reports not for exculpatory evidence that might
disconfirm the tested hypothesis, but instead for inculpatory,
confirming evidence.99 In Earl Washington's case, for example, the
prosecutor might have been looking for the fact of the confession,
96. Griffin, supra note 30, at 266-68.
97. For a discussion of the powers of the prosecuting attorney, see generally Angela J.
Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 393, 432-38 (2001) (describing prosecutorial abuse of the charging power); Green,
supra note 12, at 1587-88 (describing prosecutorial discretion); Grifftn, supra note 30, at 263-
303 (discussing the various aspects and restrictions on prosecutorial discretion as well as
recommending standards that should guide it).
98. See POPPER, supra note 43, at 32-33.
99. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of confirmation bias.
1603
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
not for the surrounding circumstances that might undermine its
reliability.
If the investigation is still ongoing, confirmation bias might cause
law enforcement officers to conduct searches and to ask questions
that will yield either further inculpatory evidence or nothing at all.
Just as Snyder and Swann's subjects primarily asked suspected
extroverts questions like "What would you do if you wanted to liven
things up at a party?,"' police eyeing an initial suspect might ask,
"What were you and the victim fighting about the night before the
murder?" Confirmation bias will reduce the likelihood that the
investigation will be directed in a manner that would yield evidence
of innocence.' 0 '
Recent attention to the risks of wrongful convictions' 2 has
brought to light the influence of "tunnel vision," whereby the belief
that a particular suspect has committed the crime might obfuscate
an objective evaluation of alternative suspects or theories. 03 In
Illinois, a special commission on capital punishment identified
tunnel vision as a contributing factor in many of the capital
convictions of thirteen men who were subsequently exonerated and
released from death row.'0 4 Similarly, in Canada, a report issued
100. Snyder & Swam, supra note 33, at 1204.
101. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
102. Much of this attention has come from postconviction exonerations of innocent
defendants, often in the form of DNA evidence, and even in a startling number of capital
cases. See, e.g., JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 262-67 (2000)
(providing statistics on DNA exonerations); Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence
and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ article.phpdid=412&scid=6 (listing
123 death-row exonerations since 1973) (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
103. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
550, 559 (1987) ("The natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory evidence
for what it is, but to categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity."); James McCloskey,
Commentary, Convicting the Innocent, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 56 (1989) (noting that "[o]nce
[the police] come to suspect someone as the culprit .... [e]vidence or information that does not
fit the suspect or the prevailing theory of the crime is dismissed as not material or is changed
to implicate the suspect"); Medwed, supra note 8, at 140-41 (discussing prosecutorial
deference to police with tunnel vision); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal
Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945
(1999) (noting that prosecutors "get wedded to their theory and things inconsistent with their
theory are ignored" (citation omitted)).
104. COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19-22 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/
ccp/ccpreports/commission-report/ chapter_02.pdf.
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under the authority of federal, provincial, and territorial justice
ministers concluded that tunnel vision was one of the eight most
common factors leading to convictions of the innocent. °5 In
cognitive terms, the tunnel vision phenomenon is simply one
application of the widespread cognitive phenomenon of confirmation
bias. Law enforcement fails to investigate alternative theories of the
crime because people generally fail to look for evidence that
disconfirms working hypotheses.
B. Sticky Presumptions of Guilt
If the prosecutor decides to pursue charges, the potential of
cognitive bias to taint decision making only worsens. Prosecutorial
reluctance to revisit a theory of guilt is difficult to explain when
prosecutors are viewed as rational actors. Attempts to do so often
rely on accounts of either individual or institutional indifference
to the truth.' °6 However, widespread prosecutorial skepticism of
innocence claims is wholly understandable, and in fact predictable,
in light of disconfirmation bias, belief perseverance, and cognitive
consistency. Although some have argued to the contrary, 10 7 many
commentators believe that the ethical prosecutor brings charges
only when she is sufficiently certain in her own mind of the ac-
cused's guilt.' 8 Accordingly, if charges are brought, the prosecutor
105. FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION
OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 3, 34-41 (2005), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/
pub/hop/PreventionOfMiscarriagesOfJustice.pdf.
106. See McCloskey, supra note 103, at 56.
107. Commonly cited for this proposition is Professor Uviller, who wrote, "[W]hen the
issue stands in equipoise in his own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the
truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the
matter before the judge or jury." Uviller, supra note 28, at 1159; see also Fisher, supra note
7, at 230 n.144 (noting that the "prevailing view, at least in the world of practice, surely" does
not require prosecutors to have a personal belief in the defendant's guilt); Zacharias, supra
note 11, at 94 (asserting that "prosecutors need not act as judges of their witness's testimony
unless they are sure the witness is falsifying facts"). The limited scope of Uviller's oft-quoted
approval of the agnostic prosecutor is apparent. More recently, Uviller explained, "The
prosecutor should be assured to a fairly high degree of certainty that he has the right
person." H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2000) [hereinafter Uviller, The Neutral
Prosecutor].
108. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 29, at 219 ("[Clonscientious prosecutors do not put
the destructive engine of the criminal process into motion unless they are satisfied beyond
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has presumably made a personal determination about the defen-
dant's guilt. If additional evidence arises, selective information
processing comes into play. The prosecutor will accept at face value
any evidence that supports the theory of guilt and will interpret
ambiguous evidence in a manner that strengthens her faith in
the case." 9 Should any potentially exonerative evidence arise,
she will scrutinize it carefully, searching for an explanation that
undermines the reliability of the evidence or otherwise reconciles
it with the existing theory of guilt."' As a result of selective
information processing, she will continue to adhere to her initial
charging decision, regardless of the new information.
Indeed, even if the inculpatory evidence that initially supported
the charges is wholly undermined, belief perseverance suggests
that the theory of guilt will nevertheless linger. Others have noted
the large number of cases, such as Earl Washington's, in which
prosecutors continue to insist that a released defendant remains a
suspect."' Although prosecutorial resistance to claims of factual
a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty."); Gershman, supra note 9, at 309 (noting from
experience that it was "accepted ethos' that prosecutors should not take a case to trial unless
personally convinced of the defendant's guilt); Green, supra note 12, at 1588 ("[P]rosecutors
are expected to bring prosecutions only when the guilt of the accused is sufficiently certain.");
John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 178-79
(1965) (noting from his own experience that "[tihe great majority, if not all, of the assistants
felt that it was morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one was personally convinced of his
guilt"); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REv. 669, 700 ("Prosecutors do not serve the interests of society by pursuing cases where the
prosecutors themselves have reasonable doubts as to the factual guilt of the defendants.");
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. ASSN B. CITY
N.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956) (noting that charging decisions are made "only after [prosecutors]
have satisfied [themselves] of the defendant's actual guilt").
109. See supra Part I.B for a summary of selective information processing and
disconfirmation bias.
110. See supra Part I.B.
111. See Freedman, supra note 3, at 1100-01, for a discussion of the government's reaction
to exculpatory evidence presented by Washington's defense counsel. A released defendant's
celebration will be commonly coupled with a prosecutor's statement that the defendant has
not been exonerated. See Glod, supra note 1 (quoting Earl Washington's prosecutor as saying
that he "cannot rule out" Washington as a suspect); Sara Rimer, DNA Testing in Rape Cases
Frees Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12 (reporting that a defendant
was released after fifteen years based on exonerating DNA; prosecutor insists there is "no
reason to doubt the validity of [the defendant's] confession" but that "there is [in]sufficient
evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt, and in this business a tie goes to the
defendant"). In at least one case, the prosecution decided to retry the defendant after new
DNA evidence led to his release. Bruce Lambert, Prosecutor Will Retry Man Freed by DNA
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innocence is often attributed to a prosecutorial culture tainted by
politics and an indifference to justice," 2 sticky beliefs about guilt
may simply be the result of belief perseverance.
Consider, for example, the government's much criticized spy
charges against Ahmad Al Halabi, an Air Force translator at the
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay."' The initial evidence
appeared damning. Al Halabi had stored nearly two hundred
detainee notes in his personal laptop, had taken prohibited
photographs of the base's guard towers, and had plans to travel
to Syria." 4 A computer analyst concluded from an inspection of
Al Halabi's laptop that he had already e-mailed some of the stored
documents over the Internet." 5
Within weeks, a different computer investigator concluded that
the initial analysis of the laptop was flawed and that Al Halabi had
not sent any material over the Internet."6 Nevertheless, for
nearly four months prosecutors continued to seek additional
analysis from the "best places.""' Even when prosecutors concluded
that absolutely no evidence existed to show that Al Halabi e-mailed
any materials, the government dismissed only those charges that
alleged the transmittal of classified information; sixteen charges,
including espionage, remained." 8
Still, the government's case had problems. The supposedly secret
documents on Al Halabi's laptop were innocuous communications,
such as letters from detainees to parents."9 Moreover, he had an
explanation for their presence on his laptop: translators, including
himself, had been asked to alleviate a shortage of computers on the
in L.I. Rape-Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at B5 (announcing prosecutor's decision to
retry released defendant based on his retracted confession).
112. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 8, at 132-69 (discussing the institutional and political
barriers to prosecutorial recognition of postconviction claims of innocence).
113. For a summary of the investigation of a supposed spy ring at Guantanamo, see Nicole
Guadiano, Case Closed?Not Yet; Spy Charges Have Been Dropped in Guantanamo Trials, but
Many Questions Remain Unanswered, A.F. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 22.
114. 60 Minutes: Spy Ring at Gitmo? (CBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 2004) (transcript
available at http:/www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/ll/246Ominutes/main657704.shtml).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Guadiano, supra note 113.
119. 60 Minutes: Spy Ring at Gitmo?, supra note 114.
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base by using their personal computers. 20 Al Halabi did admit to
photographing the base, but only to remember his military service
there, not to conduct espionage.' 2 ' He also offered a justification
for his anticipated travel to Syria-his upcoming wedding.'22
Nevertheless, prosecutors persisted, arguing that the wedding was
a ruse to conceal Al Halabi's true intentions of delivering secret
information to an enemy. 1
23
Ultimately, the government conceded that only one of the nearly
two hundred documents on Al Halabi's computer was classified as
secret. 124 Nearly all charges were dropped, and Al Halabi agreed to
plead guilty to relatively minor charges relating to the mishandling
of a document, the prohibited photographs of the camp, and his
false statements concerning the photographs. 125 What was once a
death penalty case ended with a discharge and demotion, but no
additional jail time. 126
Some have suggested that Al Halabi was the victim of an anti-
Muslim witch hunt at Guantanamo. 2' Although Al Halabi's Muslim
faith undoubtedly contributed to the government's willingness to
believe that he was a spy, belief perseverance may have played a
larger role in the government's unwillingness to yield that belief.
After the evidence of e-mailing was demonstrated to be inaccurate,
the theory of guilt continued to taint the prosecutor's evaluation of
the remaining evidence.12 Indeed, even after the government's case
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Guadiano, supra note 113.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.; Elizabeth Mebren, Translator Pleads Guilty to Taking Documents, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at A12 (quoting a spokesperson for the Council on American-Islamic
Relations as saying that the case against Al Halabi "seemed to be based more on anti-Muslim
hysteria than ... on the actual facts"); 60 Minutes: Spy Ring at Gitmo?, supra note 114.
128. An attorney for a similarly situated defendant described the problem: "I think the
people who are responsible at Guantanamo Bay created in their minds the notion there was
a spy ring of people who were all Muslims and they were basically in cahoots with one
another." 60 Minutes: Spy Ring at Gitmo?, supra note 114 (quoting Eugene Fidell, defendant
James Yee's attorney).
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unraveled, Al Halabi's prosecutor insisted, "He was engaged in
suspicious behavior. He took prohibited photographs."129
C. The Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
The fallibility of human cognition raises especially disturbing
questions about a prosecutor's ability to determine whether
evidence is exculpatory. Under Brady v. Maryland' and its
progeny, prosecutors must disclose materially exculpatory evidence
to the defense.' The problem lies in the Court's definition of
"materiality." Borrowing from the Court's standard in Strickland v.
Washington for granting a new trial based on ineffective assistance
of counsel,1 12 the Court held in United States v. Bagley that evidence
is material and therefore required to be disclosed to the defense
"only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."' The Court defined a "reasonable probability" as
"a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."3 4
The Court subsequently made clear that the materiality standard
is not whether the trial's outcome would more likely than not have
129. Id.
130. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
131. Id. at 87. Although the Court recognized in Brady that prosecutorial suppression of
evidence could amount to a due process violation, it later restricted the scope of this due
process right to the discovery of evidence that was material either to guilt or punishment.
In Brady, the Court held that a prosecutor's failure to disclose a cooperating witness's
statement, which the defense requested and which revealed that the witness was the
principal actor in the charged murder, violated due process. Id. at 84-87. In United States v.
Agurs, the Court distinguished specific requests for information, like the one at issue in
Brady, from vague requests for exculpatory evidence and cases in which defense counsel
made no request at all. 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976). In the latter cases, the Court held that
the prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose extended only to exculpatory evidence
that met a "standard of materiality." Id. at 107. Later, in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985), the Court held that a single standard of materiality governed all cases
involving nondisclosed exculpatory evidence.
132. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court held that a trial counsel's incompetence
warrants a new trial only if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."Id. at 694. The
Strickland Court defined a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id.
133. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
134. Id.
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been different with the evidence at issue, but whether "the favor-
able evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.13 5
Because Brady's materiality standard turns on a comparison of
the supposedly exculpatory evidence and the rest of the trial record,
applying the standard prior to trial requires that prosecutors
engage in a bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review. They
must anticipate what the other evidence against the defendant will
be by the end of the trial, and then speculate in hypothetical
hindsight whether the evidence at issue would place "the whole
case " 3 6 in a different light.137 Others have previously criticized
Brady for relying on prosecutors to determine the materiality of
evidence in their own files. 13 Prosecutors, some say, are in a poor
position to evaluate the materiality of evidence because they are
unaware of the planned defense strategy 39 and are, in any event,
conflicted by their desire to win.140 Moreover, if a prosecutor
wrongly decides to withhold materially exculpatory evidence, the
misapplication of the standard may never be detected, and there
will never be judicial review of the prosecutor's decision.'
The point about Brady made in this Article is a slightly different
one. This Article does not dispute that a prosecutor's review of her
own file for exculpatory evidence might be biased; rather, this
Article sees cognitive psychology as providing a potential basis for
explaining the mechanism underlying the prosecutor's bias. From
135. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
136. Id.
137. See Green, supra note 12, at 1592 n.101 (noting the difficulty of assessing the
materiality of evidence prospectively).
138. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problems ofProsecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAML. REV. 391,393-
97 (1984); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1393 (1991).
139. Stacy, supra note 138, at 1393.
140. Capra, supra note 138, at 394-95; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony:
Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1537, 1578-79 (2000) ("In our
adversary system, any limitation like 'materiality' invites prosecutors and their law
enforcement assistants to make their own biased judgments about materiality."); Stacy,
supra note 138, at 1393.
141. Capra, supra note 138, at 396 n.35; Saltzburg, supra note 140, at 1579 (noting that,
in most cases, "withheld evidence will never see the light of day," thereby preventing judicial
review); Stacy, supra note 138, at 1393.
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this perspective, the prosecutor's application of Brady is biased not
merely because she is a zealous advocate engaged in a "competitive
enterprise," 42 but because the theory she has developed from that
enterprise might trigger cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias
and selective information processing.'43
Brady requires a prosecutor who is determining whether to
disclose a piece of evidence to the defense to speculate first about
how the remaining evidence will come together against the
defendant at trial, and then about whether a reasonable probability
exists that the piece of evidence at issue would affect the result of
the trial.1" During the first step, a risk exists that prosecutors will
engage in biased recall, retrieving from memory only those facts
that tend to confirm the hypothesis of guilt.'45 Moreover, because of
selective information processing, the prosecutor will accept at face
value the evidence she views as inculpatory, without subjecting it
to the scrutiny that a defense attorney would encourage jurors to
apply. 146
Cognitive bias would also appear to taint the second speculative
step of the Brady analysis, requiring the prosecutor to determine
the value of the potentially exculpatory evidence in the context
of the entire record."17 Because of selective information processing,
the prosecutor will look for weaknesses in evidence contradicting
142. Capra, supra note 138, at 395.
143. This Article does not attempt to tackle the difficult question of whether courts are
themselves immune to heuristics that might taint rational decision making. For example,
a number of scholars have posited that courts may favor decisions made by their
predecessors, leading to information cascades. See generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer
F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by
Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 158, 159 (1999) (analyzing the "informational cascades" that
occur among courts "when their decisions are decreasingly determined by their own
information and increasingly determined by the actions of others"); Eric Talley, Precedential
Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 87, 192 (1999) (evaluating "whether a cascade
theory of precedent represents a cogent description of legal evolution, focusing principally
on information cascades"). Reviewing courts may thus also be subject to a bias in favor of
what prior courts have already done.
144. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87-88 (1963).
145. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of confirmation bias's
effect on recall.
146. See supra Part I.B for a summary of selective information processing.
147. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
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her existing belief in the defendant's guilt.148 In short, compared
to a neutral decision maker, the prosecutor will overestimate the
strength of the government's case against the defendant and
underestimate the potential exculpatory value of the evidence
whose disclosure is at issue. As a consequence, the prosecutor will
fail to see materiality where it might in fact exist.
D. Stickier Presumptions of Guilt Postconviction
A further barrier to prosecutorial neutrality arises upon the
defendant's conviction. Just as the majority of commentators
believe that prosecutors should bring charges only when they are
personally convinced of an accused's culpability, prosecutors also
have an obligation to seek postconviction redress if they believe that
an innocent person has been convicted. 149 Even if prosecutors do not
seek the defendant's release sua sponte, one would at least expect
a conscientious prosecutor not to oppose relief for an innocent
person who requests it. 50 The problem, of course, is convincing the
prosecutor that the defendant is, in fact, innocent.
Whether the conviction was obtained through a jury verdict or
the defendant's own guilty plea, the prosecutor will view the
conviction as further evidence confirming the accuracy of her initial
theory of guilt.' The prosecutor's strengthened belief in her theory
will continue to taint her analysis of any new evidence submitted by
the defense postconviction.'52
Moreover, cognitive dissonance will further hinder the pros-
ecutor's ability to conduct a neutral evaluation of potentially
148. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of people's tendency to
scrutinize information that is dissonant with existing theories.
149. Green, supra note 11, at 637-42; Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 107, at
1704-05 (arguing that prosecutors have an obligation to investigate any "firmly based charge"
that an innocent defendant has been convicted and, if the claim is substantiated, "to urge
immediate remedy to assist the court in righting the wrong").
150. See generally Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) ("The public trust
reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to
confess error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage oflustice may result from their remaining
silent.").
151. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of selective information processing.
152. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of how belief
perseverance can affect a prosecutor's evaluation of potentially exculpatory evidence.
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exculpatory evidence.'53 The conviction of an innocent person is
inconsistent with the ethical prosecutor's belief that charges should
be brought only against suspects who are actually guilty.'54 To avoid
cognitive dissonance, an ethical prosecutor might cling to the
theory of guilt to reconcile her conduct with her beliefs, especially
after the defendant has been convicted. From this perspective,
prosecutorial bias against postconviction exculpatory evidence is
not an indication of corrupt ethics at all; rather, it may indicate a
deep but biasing adherence to the edict that prosecutors should only
do justice. A prosecutor may give short shrift to claims of innocence,
in other words, not because she is callous about wrongful convic-
tions, but because she cannot bring herself to believe that she has
played a part in one.
III. IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING
Prosecutorial shortcomings such as tunnel vision, failures to
disclose exculpatory evidence, and stubborn adherence to theories
of guilt are often categorized as "prosecutorial misconduct,"'55
suggesting a culpable mental state in the wrongdoing prosecutors.
Not surprisingly, then, commentators who seek to prevent these
prosecutorial shortcomings look for reform through improvements
in prosecutorial values.' 6 Common reform suggestions include,
153. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of postconviction belief perseverance.
154. See supra note 108 for citations to the many scholars who have concluded that an
ethical prosecutor does not bring charges unless she personally believes that the defendant
is guilty.
155. See Roberta K Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REV. 699, 734 (1998); Bennett L. Gershman,
Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRiM. L. 121, 133-35 (1998);
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV.
1, 14-20 (1999); Andrew M. Hetherington, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 90 GEO. L.J. 1679
(2002); Medwed, supra note 8, at 174.
156. Another model of reform is the limitation of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Davis,
supra note 97, at 460-64; Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the
Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-28 (1997). The judiciary is typically loathe to
intrude upon the broad discretion of prosecutors, in part out of respect for the separation of
powers. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (invoking separation of
powers concerns in setting a high standard for scrutinizing the charging decisions of federal
prosecutors). For purposes of this Article, the lessons of cognitive psychology are used to
suggest methods of improving the quality of decisions made within the scope of a prosecutor's
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for example, increases in both the frequency and severity of
sanctions against unethical prosecutors and a transformation of a
prosecutorial culture that is described as valuing conviction rates
above justice. 5 7 If only prosecutors cared about claims of innocence,
the story seems to go, we might trust their decision making.
Without disputing the suggestion that some prosecutors-both
individually and institutionally-could give more weight to doing
justice, this Article has tried to suggest that the story is a more
complicated one. This Article seeks to add a cognitive dimension
to the traditional explanation of "misconduct," not because all
prosecutors are well intentioned, but because suggesting that only
bad-intentioned prosecutors are at risk of poor decision making is
simply too easy. Prosecutors sometimes make biased decisions, this
Article has argued, because people generally are biased decision
makers. A cognitive explanation for prosecutorial bias suggests that
improving the values of prosecutors is not enough; an improvement
in the cognitive process is required. This Part attempts to set forth
some initial suggestions for reform, aimed at reducing the influence
of cognitive bias upon sound prosecutorial decision making.
A. Improving the Initial Theory of Guilt
Confirmation bias, selective information processing, and belief
perseverance are all triggered by the decision maker's existing
beliefs. In the context of prosecutorial decision making, the biasing
theory is the prosecutor's belief that the defendant is guilty. Once
that belief is formed, confirmation bias causes her to seek
information that confirms the theory of guilt; selective information
processing causes her to trust information tending to confirm the
theory of guilt and distrust potentially exculpatory evidence; and
belief perseverance causes her to adhere to the theory of guilt even
when the evidence initially supporting that theory is undermined. '58
Because the theory of guilt triggers sources of cognitive bias,
prosecutorial neutrality should be at its peak prior to the prosecu-
discretion, but the proper breadth of that discretionary authority is not addressed.
157. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part L.A-C for a summary of confirmation bias, selective information
processing, and belief perseverance.
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tor's charging decision, before she has formed a theory of guilt that
will taint subsequent information processing.159 Accordingly, the
accuracy of a prosecutor's decision making would be maximized if
she had access to all relevant evidence gathered by the police prior
to making the initial charging decision. Early access to all relevant
evidence could be improved in two ways. First, prosecutors could be
involved in investigations prior to initiating formal charges, as they
often are in the federal system or in major crime investigations at
the state level.' Second, in less serious cases in which resources
would not feasibly permit prosecutorial involvement in the cases's
investigative stage, police should record, preserve, and disclose to
the prosecutor all evidence collected during their investigation, both
inculpatory and exculpatory. 161
Because police agencies act independently of prosecutors' offices
in most jurisdictions, prosecutors have no guarantee that police will
give them the information they need to make a fully informed
evaluation of a case.'62 Although Brady provides defendants a right
of access to material exculpatory evidence, it does so through a trial
right that governs the conduct of prosecutors, not the police.'63 And
although the Supreme Court has extended prosecutors' Brady
obligations to all exculpatory evidence known to law enforcement
agencies "acting on the government's behalf in the case,"1' no
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. The prosecutor's participation during investigations is a relatively recent but
increasingly common role. See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for
Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 733-36 (1999) (discussing
the twentieth-century development of the prosecutorial role in investigations).
161. Of course, full disclosure from police to prosecutors does not resolve flaws that exist
in the investigation stage, such as the investigating officers' tunnel vision and other cognitive
biases. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 103, at 56. That is why recent reform suggestions in
the context of wrongful convictions have included training police officers to continue to
investigate all alternative theories. See, e.g., COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note
104, at 20-21. Moreover, even if flaws exist in the police investigation, full disclosure by
police officers to prosecutors, coupled with enhanced disclosure duties of prosecutors to
defense attorneys, see infra Part III, would likely increase the probability that those flaws
might be detected prior to conviction.
162. The State of Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment recently attempted to
resolve this problem in the context of preserving the integrity of capital offense
investigations. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 104, at 22.
163. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
164. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
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doctrinal basis exists for assuring prosecutorial access to this
information.
Professor Fisher has suggested that prosecutorial access to
exculpatory information gathered by the police could be increased
either directly through legislation or indirectly through changes to
the ethical rules that govern prosecutors." 5 This Article seeks only
to offer an additional reason for ensuring the police's full disclosure
of information to prosecutors and does not explore the best doctrinal
basis for doing so. Prosecutorial access to all information gathered
by police during their investigation is essential not only to the
ability of prosecutors to comply with Brady but also to the accuracy
of their initial charging decisions, which the cognitive literature
suggests are hard to shake.'66
Of course, no process can assure one hundred percent accuracy
in a prosecutor's decision making. However, improving prosecuto-
rial access to investigatory information prior to the initial charging
decision improves decision-making outcomes in two related ways.
First, it maximizes the availability of prosecutorial neutrality,
ensuring that the prosecutor's initial theory about the case is based
upon all available information. Second, to the extent that the
prosecutor's initial charging decision will bias her subsequent
decisions in the case, improving the accuracy of the prosecutor's
initial theory of guilt will mitigate from a normative perspective the
adverse effects of cognitive bias upon the prosecutor's ultimate
decisions.
B. Educating Prosecutors and Future Prosecutors
Another possible method of improving prosecutorial decision
making is to train prosecutors and future prosecutors about the
sources of cognitive bias and the potential effects of cognitive
bias upon rational decision making. Commentators often look to
165. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty To Seek Exculpatory Evidence
in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379, 1385 (2000); see also
Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1251-55 (2001) (comparing the Brady regime to the English requirement
that police record and disclose to prosecutors all relevant information).
166. See supra Part II.A.
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education to improve prosecutorial decision making," 7 but they
tend to emphasize education about good prosecutorial values. They
have argued, for example, that prosecutors should be admonished
to approach cases with "a healthy skepticism" and "to assume an
active role in confirming the truth of the evidence of guilt and
investigating contradictory evidence of innocence."168 To the
virtuous prosecutor, these obligations are apparent. What is less
apparent are the cognitive biases that may taint the decision
making of even ethical prosecutors.
With increased academic attention to the effects of cognitive bias
on legal theory, doctrine, and practice, there has been some
movement toward teaching law students about the limits of their
own rationality. 6 ' Additionally, recent responses to wrongful
convictions have included the recommendation that prosecutors
learn about cognitive bias and its effects upon prosecutorial decision
making.' 70 Some empirical evidence suggests that self-awareness
of cognitive limitations can improve the quality of individual
decision making. 17' For example, recall that in their well-known
experiment involving the fake suicide note task, Ross, Lepper, and
Hubbard found that both the actors who performed the task and
the observers who watched maintained their beliefs about the
actors' ability to perform the task, even after being told that the
experimenters provided false feedback. 72 As part of the study,
experimenters also exposed some subjects to a further "process
debriefing," which provided a detailed discussion of the belief
167. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511, 1513 (2000).
168. Gershman, supra note 9, at 342, 348.
169. See Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies
in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 731, 734 (2003)
(illustrating the use of case studies in clinical education to teach students about cognitive
bias).
170. COMMN ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 104, at 111 (suggesting that all
prosecutors and defense lawyers who try capital cases should receive periodic training on the
dangers of tunnel vision or confirmation bias, and other factors contributing to wrongful
convictions); FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, supra note 105, at 40-41
(recommending educating prosecutors about tunnel vision).
171. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 16, at 191 ("The effectiveness of a variety of
procedures for discrediting information also may depend on their capacity to make subjects
aware of some of the processes underlying the perseverance of their beliefs.").
172. See Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, supra note 76, at 880-87.
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perseverance phenomenon.'73 The experimenters found that
process debriefing eliminated the effects of the false feedback, at
least among the subjects who completed the task themselves.174
However, some social science evidence suggests that self-
awareness is not enough to prevent cognitive bias. For example,
although Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard found that "process debrief-
ing" about the phenomenon of belief perseverance eliminated belief
perseverance among subjects concerning their own performance on
the suicide note task, they also found continued perseverance
effects among observer subjects, despite process debriefing.'75 In
other words, observer subjects continued to view an actor's ability
as consistent with the discredited feedback.7 6 Similarly, Wason
found that alerting subjects to their errors in the card-selection task
did little to improve their accuracy in selecting the appropriate
cards for hypothesis testing.'77 Accordingly, although education
about cognitive bias may hold some potential to improve prosecuto-
rial decision making, it is doubtful that education alone will assure
prosecutorial neutrality.
C. The Practice of "Switching Sides"
One possible method for the ethical prosecutor to avoid cognitive
bias would be to act as her own neutralizing adversary by generat-
ing pro-defense counterarguments to her own prosecutorial
interpretations of the evidence against the defendant. Cognitive
research suggests that the generation of explanatory arguments
plays a role in belief perseverance, and that generating explanatory
counterarguments can mitigate belief perseverance. For example,
recall Anderson, Lepper, and Ross's study, in which subjects were
led to believe through fictionalized case histories that either a
negative or positive correlation existed between risk preference and
173. Id. at 885.
174. Id. at 887-88.
175. Id. at 888.
176. Id.
177. See WASON & JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 38, at 194-97 (summarizing evidence
demonstrating the difficulty subjects had with the card-selection task even when fully
informed about the correct response).
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firefighting abilities.178 The study replicated the basic belief
perseverance phenomenon, with subjects continuing to adhere to
beliefs about the perceived relationship even after learning that the
case histories were fictional.'79 Importantly though, the researchers
asked subjects prior to the debriefing to generate possible explana-
tions for the perceived relationship."S Those subjects who generated
a plausible theory to support the observed correlation displayed
more perseverance than subjects whose explanations simply
restated the existence of an observed correlation.' 8 '
One suggested mechanism for belief perseverance, then, is that
once a theory is formed to explain a data set, it exists apart from
the data and may continue to be treated as the most plausible
theory even after the underlying data is discredited.'82 Such a
mechanism suggests that generating countertheories should
mitigate perseverance effects, and the cognitive literature does
provide some support for counterexplanation as a debiasing
technique.lS Anderson and Sechler, for example, found that
178. See Anderson, Lepper & Ross, supra note 84, at 1039. The study is summarized in
notes 183-86 infra and accompanying text.
179. Anderson, Lepper & Ross, supra note 84, at 1045.
180. Id. at 1039.
181. Id. at 1045; see also Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 244-48 (finding that subjects
who produced causal arguments to support their beliefs were more likely to show a
perseverance of belief after the presentation of evidence that explicitly disconfirmed their
initial beliefs); Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: Effects of Real and
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817,
825-26 (1977) (finding that subjects who generated an explanation for purely hypothetical
data demonstrated greater belief perseverance than subjects who had not generated an
explanation).
182. Anderson, Lepper & Ross, supra note 84, at 1047; see also NISBE7Tr & ROSS, supra
note 16, at 183-86 (attributing belief perseverance to misplaced adherence to causal
explanations); Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing
Techniques in the Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNION 126, 128 (1982)
[hereinafter Anderson, Inoculation] (suggesting a possible mechanism for the perseverance
enhancing effect of explanation). Some have suggested that confirmation bias and the
availability heuristic may play a role in the mechanism for belief perseverance. If people
search their memories for confirming evidence to support a theory while they are forming
it, that retrieved information remains available and therefore influential to decision making,
even after the initial evidence that led to the theory is undermined. See KUNDA, supra note
16, at 100 (suggesting a link between belief perseverance and the availability heuristic).
183. See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 16, at 190 ("It seems probable that attempts to
discredit beliefs may have relatively greater impact when they prompt the use of plausible
theories or 'scripts' that encompass both the initial information and the subsequent challenge
to that information.").
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subjects who were asked to generate arguments to support an
assigned position shifted their attitudes toward the assigned
position.1 4 However, when the experimenters asked subjects to
generate arguments to support the opposite position, the belief
perseverance effects were reversed.8 5 Similarly, Lord, Lepper, and
Preston found a corrective effect when subjects were induced to
consider opposing possibilities, either upon explicit instruction or
through exposure to materials that made the opposing possibility
more salient.8 6
In lawyer terms, a prosecutor seeking to avoid cognitive bias
through counterexplanation would simply switch litigation sides
and play the role of her own devil's advocate, a practice she
probably learned her first year of law school. The mental exercise
of switching sides could help mitigate cognitive bias in two separate
contexts.' 87 First, as evidence is evaluated on an ongoing basis
during a case's pendency, the prosecutor could try to generate
plausible explanations of both guilt and innocence for each piece
of incoming evidence. This procedure might serve as inoculation
against unwarranted belief perseverance by preventing the
prosecutor's theory of guilt from becoming disconnected from the
evidence underlying it. Second, if an early piece of evidence is
subsequently discredited, a prosecutor who had formed an opinion
of guilt based in part on the discredited evidence could imagine
alternative explanations for any remaining evidence. This counter-
explanation exercise of switching sides would assist the prosecutor
in an unbiased evaluation of the prosecution's remaining case
without the discredited evidence.
184. Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Explanation and
Counterexplanation on the Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 24, 27-28 (1986).
185. Id. at 29.
186. Lord, Lepper & Preston, supra note 65, at 1239. The researchers found that both
strategies for inducing subjects to consider the opposite had greater corrective effects than
instructions for subjects to be fair and unbiased. Id.
187. These examples are based upon psychologist Craig Anderson's examples of how
perseverance-reducing procedures can be used generally. See Anderson, Inoculation, supra
note 182, at 129.
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D. Second Opinions and Committee Input
Another possible method to mitigate the influence of cognitive
bias on prosecutorial decision making is to involve additional,
unbiased decision makers in the process. The reduction of bias
might be achieved internally within a prosecutor's office by
establishing a process for "fresh looks" of a file by a lawyer or a
committee of lawyers whose evaluation would not be tainted by
earlier developments in the case.18 For example, such a process
might be helpful when the prosecuting attorney learns of a new
piece of potentially exonerating evidence and the initial theory of
guilt might cause her to undervalue its importance.' A fresh look
might also be helpful when the credibility of a piece of evidence
that contributed to the prosecutor's initial charging decision is
undermined. A separate attorney would be able to comment on the
strength of existing evidence against the defendant without the
taint of a preexisting theory of guilt. 9 ° Similarly, a fresh look
attorney would not be biased by the desire to avoid the cognitive
dissonance associated with having charged an innocent person with
a crime.' 9 '
Limitations exist, however, in another prosecutor's ability to
provide a neutral evaluation of a coworker's case. Herbert Packer
observed long ago the operational "presumption of guilt" that allows
the fast-paced case screening process in most district attorneys'
offices to function.'92 At least some prosecutors might open each
188. The establishment of internal "fresh look" procedures would resemble committees
formed in some district attorneys' offices to review cases resting upon the testimony of a
single eyewitness. See Medwed, supra note 8, at 127 & n.6; Robin Topping, Panel Puts
Justice Before Prosecution, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 2003, at A21 (describing such a committee in
Nassau County, New York).
189. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of how a prosecutor's initial charging decision
may cause her to underestimate the exculpatory value of subsequently discovered evidence.
190. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of how belief perseverance can cause a prosecutor
to adhere to her theory of guilt even after critical evidence against the defendant is
undermined.
191. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of how the avoidance of cognitive dissonance can
prevent prosecutors from acknowledging that they have charged or convicted an innocent
person of a crime.
192. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160 (1968) ("The
presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal efficiently with large
numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands.").
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new file assuming that police would not have arrested the suspect
and referred him for charges if they did not have their man.193
Accordingly, a prosecutor serving as a fresh look attorney may be
tainted by an initial theory of guilt even before reading a police
report. Moreover, a fresh look attorney may be reluctant to dissent
from her colleague's initial case evaluation. The social science
literature demonstrates the difficulty decision makers have in
resisting the power of their peers. 9 4 For example, in Solomon Asch's
classic studies on conformity, he found that large percentages of
subjects could be induced to reach erroneous conclusions in a simple
line-matching task if a number of the researchers' confederates first
answered incorrectly. 1
95
Accordingly, a more meaningful fresh look process might involve
an advisory committee that includes nonprosecutors. Asch's
research on conformity demonstrated the power of even one lone
dissenting voice to encourage people to depart from group opinion
and assess a problem independently.196 Judges, defense attorneys,
and civil practitioners would be less likely to apply a presumption
of guilt and would feel less pressure to conform their views to other
prosecutors; accordingly, they may be more likely to provide a true
fresh look.' 97
193. See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 98, 112
(1975) (describing the phenomenon of "pre-conviction" as the tendency of prosecutors to
presume the guilt of the accused).
194. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30
SOCIOMETRY 410, 418 (1967) (finding that subjects' approval of conduct conformed to their
peers' opinions).
195. Specifically, subjects were asked to choose which of three lines was the same length
as a comparison line. See SOLOMON E. AsCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450-59 (1952) [hereinafter
ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; Solomon E. Asch, Studies ofIndependence and Conformity: A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1956); see also
Richard S. Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 191, 196 (1955)
(replicating Asch's study with female subjects).
196. Asch demonstrated the power of a lone dissenting voice in his line-matching studies.
When experimenters varied the research design to include one accurate confederate among
the inaccurate peers, subjects deviated from majority opinion and chose the correct line.
ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 195, at 477-79; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 21 (2003) (noting that the lone person with knowledge of the truth
may not want to risk her reputation by insisting that she is correct).
197. See NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 16, at 291 (suggesting that collective and
institutional judgments are most capable of improvement because of the potential to
formalize decision-making procedures to account for cognitive barriers to effective
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Some prosecutors might resist the involvement of outsiders in
the case-evaluation process as an unwarranted intrusion into
prosecutorial discretion. However, the full scope of prosecutorial
discretion could be preserved if the fresh look committee served
solely in an advisory capacity and the district attorney's office
retained ultimate decision-making authority. Moreover, the
committee's advisory capacity could be limited to specific questions,
such as the strength of a case or the potential value of exonerating
evidence.'98 Such a limited consulting role would not involve the
committee in the broader policy questions that generally justify
deference to prosecutorial discretion, such as the jurisdiction's
enforcement priorities or where a single case fits within those
priorities.'99
With limited responsibilities, a diversely constituted fresh look
committee could be modeled loosely after the civilian review boards
that increasingly monitor police.2 °0 Most of those boards participate
in the oversight of police departments in narrow ways, such as
resolving complaints against individual police officers, without
interfering in broader questions about the department's policing
evaluations).
198. Professor Freedman has suggested a similar process in which a panel acting like a
grand jury would review postconviction innocence claims in capital cases. See Eric M.
Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposals for
Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 315, 322-23 (1990).
199. The judiciary has typically deferred to prosecutorial discretion, reasoning that its
exercise calls for decisions that the judiciary is ill-equipped to make. These include decisions
about law enforcement priorities, the appropriateness of a single prosecution as a part of
those priorities, the allocation of prosecutorial resources, and the individualization ofjustice
in a single case. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (noting that the
prosecutor, not the judiciary, must evaluate the merits of the case, allocation of resources,
and enforcement objectives); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,607 (1985) ("Such factors
as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's
enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.").
200. See generally David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devil's
Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 236-37 (Jack R. Greene &
Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (arguing that external monitoring of police is an essential
component of implementing community policing); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and
the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 551, 575-78 (1997) (discussing the increase in the use of civilian oversight boards in
the policing context).
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strategies.201 Although police departments initially balked at even
minimal civilian involvement in their affairs, at least some role
for external monitoring of police is increasingly acceptable." 2 If
prosecutors' offices could survive a similar cultural adjustment,
they could have the benefits of neutral fresh looks without sacrific-
ing the autonomy brought by prosecutorial discretion.0 3
E. Prosecutorial Involvement in Innocence Projects
Another proposal for reform is increased prosecutorial involve-
ment in the organizations that govern and address professional
ethics among lawyers generally and prosecutors specifically, such
as state and local bar committees, innocence projects, and groups
concerned with providing quality defense representation in criminal
cases. Currently, prosecutors are underrepresented in bar and pro
bono oriented activities.20 4 Apart from the benefits that might inure
to these organizations from increased and diversified participation,
prosecutorial involvement in such groups would provide prosecutors
with a venue for behavior demonstrating their commitment to
protecting innocent defendants. That objective behavioral commit-
ment could in turn assist prosecutors in their own internal decision
making by mitigating the biasing effects of cognitive dissonance.
Part II.D suggested that cognitive dissonance might prevent
prosecutors from neutrally evaluating defendants' claims of
innocence because ethical prosecutors may not want to believe that
they have convicted, or even charged, an innocent person of a crime.
Accordingly, to resist dissonance, the prosecutor might underesti-
201. Livingston, supra note 200, at 665.
202. Id. at 664-66.
203. Professor Davis has advocated the creation of prosecution review boards to review
complaints against prosecutors and their discretionary decisions. Davis, supra note 97, at
463-64. This Article's proposal differs by recommending the participation of outsiders to
improve the quality of prosecutorial decisions as they are being made.
204. See, e.g., The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
53 (1999) (statement of John Smietanka, former prosecutor) (testifying that 'Itlime, money
and, to some unfortunate extent, a cultural chasm" prevent prosecutors from "meaningful
participation" in bar activities); cf Lisa G. Lerman, Public Service by Public Servants, 19
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1141 (1991) (noting obstacles that prevent government lawyers from
undertaking pro bono work).
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mate the merits of a claim to innocence. °5 However, recent research
on dissonance suggests that dissonance resistance can be mitigated
when people are given an alternative method of affirming their
own values and self-perceptions. For example, Claude Steele has
theorized that cognitive dissonance results from people's desire to
affirm their own sense of integrity.2 6 According to Steele's self-
affirmation theory, a person changes her beliefs in the face of
dissonant conduct because the act implies that the person is not
"morally adequate" and challenges the person's self-adequacy. 27 To
affirm her own image, the person adjusts her beliefs in response to
the dissonance.2 °8 Steele's theory is consistent with this Article's
suggestion that prosecutors may resist reevaluating a defendant's
guilt in an attempt to preserve their own sense of professional
integrity.
Steele's research provides some support not only for the theorized
mechanism underlying the reaction to dissonance, but also for its
corollary that belief adjustment in response to dissonance can be
mitigated if people are provided an alternative mechanism for
self-affirmation. For example, Steele and Liu asked subjects to
write an essay supporting increases in tuition, even though the
subjects opposed the hikes.20 9 Subjects were also asked to complete
a questionnaire about politics and economics.210 Replicating the
classic finding of cognitive dissonance, subjects generally demon-
strated a change in their beliefs, reporting less opposition to tuition
increases after writing essays favoring them.21 However, the
researchers found that subjects who valued politics and economics,
and who had affirmed their values by completing the required
questionnaire, demonstrated less belief change as a result of the
forced counterattitudinal essay.212 The researchers construed the
205. See supra Part II.D.
206. Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the
Self, in 21 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.261, 277 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1988).
207. Id. at 278.
208. Id.
209. Claude M. Steele & Thomas J. Liu, Dissonance Processes as Self-Affirmation, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7-8 (1983).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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data as suggesting that salient, self-affirming cognitions might
help people respond objectively to information that challenges their
self-image.213
Similarly, in another study, researchers found that subjects who
were asked to write an essay opposing state funding for the
construction of handicapped facilities demonstrated less change in
their beliefs about the appropriateness of such facilities if they
expected to have an opportunity to personally assist the handi-
capped after the experiment.214
These studies suggest that prosecutors could mitigate the effects
of dissonance resistance on decision making by creating alternative
mechanisms to support their own self images as ethical prosecutors
committed to the pursuit of justice. Personal involvement in
professional organizations that value legal and prosecutorial ethics
might increase the prosecutor's own confidence in her commitment
to protecting the innocent and may therefore decrease the likelihood
of bias in evaluating claims of innocence.
F. Repairing Brady
This Article's final suggestion for reform concerns a prosecutor's
disclosure of evidence to the defense under Brady v. Maryland.215
The previously suggested reforms of increased prosecutorial access
to information, prosecutorial training about cognitive bias, the
practice of switching litigation sides, internal fresh look reviews,
and prosecutorial involvement in professional organizations all
carry some potential to improve a prosecutor's application of the
Brady standard because they all seek to mitigate cognitive bias and
will therefore increase the likelihood of an accurate assessment of
the exculpatory value of a piece of evidence. Additional improve-
213. Id.
214. Claude M. Steele & Thomas J. Liu, Making the Dissonant Act Unreflective of Self
Dissonance Avoidance and the Expectancy of a Value-Affirming Response, 7 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 393, 396-97 (1981). Subjects demonstrated reduced attitude change as
a result of writing the essay if they were led to believe that they would provide study
assistance for blind students after the experiment. Id. at 393.
215. See Part II.C, supra, for a discussion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
the potential of cognitive bias to affect its application.
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ment in prosecutorial disclosure, however, requires a rethinking of
Brady's materiality standard.
As explored in Part II.C, limiting a prosecutor's constitutional
disclosure obligation to evidence that poses a "reasonable probabil-
ity"216 of affecting a case's outcome invites decision making that is
biased against disclosure. Because the prosecutor has already
formed a theory of guilt, she will overestimate the value of
inculpatory evidence, underestimate the value of the exculpatory
evidence, and ultimately undercount instances of materiality.217 The
problem with the Court's Brady doctrine is its use of a harmless
error standard not just in determining whether the reversal of a
conviction is warranted based on the nondisclosure of exculpatory
evidence, but also in determining whether disclosure is required in
the first place.
This flaw results from the Court's misplaced reliance in the
Brady context on the standard established in Strickland v.
Washington218 for granting a new trial based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.219 Importantly, unlike Brady's materiality
standard, the Court's test under Strickland is a two-prong test that
separates the standard for attorney performance from the question
of the defendant's entitlement to a new trial should counsel fail to
meet that standard.22 ° The first prong makes clear that the
standard for attorney performance is that of "reasonably effective
assistance."22' The second prong of Strickland applies as a harm-
less error standard, asking whether the deficiency of counsel's
performance affected the trial's outcome.222 In light of the two
216. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
217. See supra Part II.C.
218. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court held that the demonstration of trial
counsel's incompetence warrants a new trial only if "there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. The Strickland Court defined a "reasonable probability" as "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
219. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (relying on Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, in defining the
"materiality" of evidence subject to disclosure).
220. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
221. Id. Trial counsel's performance is measured by an objective standard and is
reasonably effective if her services fall within the range of competence demanded in a
criminal case. Id. at 687-88.
222. Id. at 694.
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prongs separating the standard for attorney performance from the
standard for a defendant's remedy, a defense attorney who looked
to Strickland for guidance about her duties of performance would
be hard pressed to argue that she was professionally, ethically, and
legally entitled to provide an incompetent, unreasonable defense as
long as her client was a lost cause.223
Unlike Strickland's two-prong test, the Court's prosecutorial
disclosure jurisprudence establishes a single standard for determin-
ing both counsel's obligations and the defendant's entitlement to
relief if those obligations go unmet.224 As a standard for determining
the availability of postconviction relief, Brady's materiality
requirement may be a sensible method of ensuring that convictions
are not lightly reversed when undisclosed evidence could not have
affected a case's disposition. It is not, however, a helpful pretrial
standard for prosecutors trying to determine at the outset whether
to disclose evidence to the defense.
The standard governing prosecutors' disclosure to the defense
should be separate from the standard that determines whether a
defendant's conviction should be reversed due to a failure to
disclose. Importantly, to mitigate cognitive bias, the standard for
disclosure should require prosecutors to evaluate the potential
exculpatory value of evidence from the defense's perspective, not
through the lens of their preexisting theory of guilt. For example,
Professor Capra suggested long ago that prosecutors should be
required to disclose any evidence "favorable to the defendant's
preparation or presentation of his defense."225
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d), the ethical rule
governing prosecutors' disclosure of evidence, is a step in the right
direction because it requires prosecutors to "make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecu-
223. Strickland does permit a court reviewing trial counsel's performance after the fact
to apply the second prong first, thereby avoiding any ruling on the attorney's performance
by ruling instead that any proven incompetence would have been harmless. Id. at 697.
Accordingly, Strickland does permit attorney incompetence to go unaddressed absent
separate civil or disciplinary proceedings against counsel. Nevertheless, as a decision
providing prospective guidance to defense counsel, Strickland does make clear that the
standard for attorney performance is reasonably effective assistance. Id. at 687.
224. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
225. Capra, supra note 138, at 428.
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tor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense."226 Although the rule primarily codifies prosecutors'
constitutional obligations under Brady, the provision does not
contain the limitation of materiality found in the Court's due
process jurisprudence.227
Unfortunately, an ethical rule that governs prosecutorial
disclosure is unlikely to alter the psychology of prosecutors trained
to apply the well-known, constitutionally based Brady standard. As
an initial matter, prosecutors receive far more training about the
constitutional rules of criminal procedure than about ethical
rules.22 Accordingly, they may not even be aware that Model Rule
3.8(d) requires broader disclosure than Brady. Even if aware of the
gap between the Model Rule and Brady's materiality standard,
prosecutors may feel an obligation as an advocate to violate Model
Rule 3.8(d) and to pursue all constitutional means of convicting a
defendant they believe is guilty.229 Because prosecutors, unlike
private attorneys, are members of law enforcement, empowered by
the executive branch, it is not uncommon for them to think of their
obligations only as law enforcement officers governed by constitu-
tional and statutory rules, not as lawyers governed by the rules of
professional conduct.23 °
226. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1998). With respect to sentencing, the
rule goes on to require disclosure to the defense and the court of "all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor ...." Id.
227. See Gershman, supra note 9, at 328 (noting that prosecutors' constitutional
obligations are narrower than their ethical obligations under Rule 3.8(d)); Lisa M. Kurcias,
Note, Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1205-
06, 1216 (2000) (discussing the difference between prosecutors' obligations under Brady and
Model Rule 3.8(d)).
228. See Melilli, supra note 108, at 686 (explaining that young lawyers entering into
service as prosecutors are inexperienced and given little or no education in prosecutorial
ethics).
229. See John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows," 53
U. PiTT. L. REv. 271, 274-75 (1992) (noting that prosecutors' groups and especially the
Department of Justice have been critical of the American Bar Association's attempts to
regulate the unethical conduct of prosecutors).
230. See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 761 (noting that bar authorities often operate under
the power of the judiciary and may be reluctant to discipline prosecutors because of concerns
about the separation of powers). When Richard Thornburgh was Attorney General, for
example, he accused "[t]he defense bar, with ABA sponsorship, [of] attempting to use rules
of professional conduct to stymie criminal investigations and prosecutions." Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Association of Attorneys General, and National District
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The failure of bar authorities to inject ethical rules into the daily
practice of prosecutors does little to alter this psychology. Even
prosecutors who violate their constitutional disclosure obligations
are rarely disciplined.23  Thus, prosecutors who fail to disclose
evidence that falls under Model Rule 3.8(d), but not Brady, are
unlikely to be disciplined.232 In short, the rejection of the materiality
requirement by Model Rule 3.8(d), standing alone, is unlikely to
alter the decision-making process of a prosecutor evaluating the
exculpatory value of evidence.
Critics of Brady have suggested a variety of alternative reforms.
Professor Capra has argued for a right to in camera inspection of
the prosecutors' files so that a judge can fully effectuate the
defendants' Brady rights. 3 Still others have argued for the "open
file" policies already adopted by several jurisdictions in capital
prosecutions.2 34 This Article's purpose is not to explore fully the
Attorneys Association (Aug. 6, 1991). He argued that the enforcement of ethical rules against
prosecutors amounted to
an undisguised effort by the defense bar to undo what both Congress and the
Supreme Court have declared to be the law .... We find it curious and
inappropriate that the ABA, in which the interests of the defense bar are well-
represented, should be in the business of making rules for the government's
conduct of criminal prosecutions, particularly in areas where the courts and
legislatures have already acted. This is the business of Congress and the courts.
Id.
231. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong
Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 833, 898 (1997) ("ITihe disciplinary process
has been almost totally ineffective in sanctioning even egregious Brady violations.");
Zacharias, supra note 13, at 755.
232. See Green, supra note 12, at 1593 (reporting that "courts and disciplinary authorities
do not sanction prosecutors for failing to disclose evidence as required by the rule but not by
other law").
233. Capra, supra note 138, at 426-30.
234. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,2145-56
(2000) (calling for open file access in capital cases); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1153-54 (2004) (arguing in favor of open file discovery as
a prophylactic rule to protect Brady rights); Victor Bass, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and
the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 112, 113 (1972) ("mhe prosecutor's
entire file should, except in special cases, be open to defense inspection."). But see John G.
Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY
L.J. 437, 460-61 (2001) (arguing that open file and other informal discovery processes have
shortcomings); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
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relative strengths and weaknesses of all possible reforms. Rather,
this Article's intention is to demonstrate that the Brady rule should
be modified to separate the standard that governs the disclosure
requirement from the harmless error standard that determines the
availability of a remedy if required discovery is withheld. Moreover,
in light of what we know about cognitive bias, the governing
standard for prosecutorial disclosure should attempt to avoid the
recipe for cognitive disaster that is inherent in the current Brady
standard. Broadening the Brady standard to include all favorable
information, rather than just materially favorable information,
would be a helpful move in the right direction. A standard turning
on the favorability of the evidence instead of its materiality invites
reviewing the file from the defense's perspective and therefore
mitigates the influence of the prosecutor's preexisting theory of
guilt on the decision-making process.
CONCLUSION
I wanted to write this Article to explore questions I have carried
in my own mind since my first weeks as a prosecutor. Fresh out of
my judicial clerkship, I was asked to help draft the papers required
to obtain the release of two people who had been convicted of
murder five years earlier. Police suspected that the woman whom
the defendants supposedly killed, Tanya Bennett, was in fact the
victim of a self-named, self-confessed serial killer. But even after
the so-called Happy Face Killer included Bennett on his list of
victims and provided detailed information about her murder, the
prosecutors in my office who had obtained the original convictions
remained doubtful. The Happy Face Killer must have known one of
the convicted defendants, they speculated, or perhaps read the
details in the newspaper. Only when the man led police to Bennett's
long-abandoned purse, buried beneath half a decade's growth of
blackberry bushes near the Columbia River Gorge, did the state
agree to release the previously convicted defendants.
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1462-64 (1987) (arguing that open file policies deter prosecutors
from seeking out additional information that might benefit the defendant).
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As a new lawyer reviewing the reports only with the benefit of
hindsight, I could see potential problems with the prosecution's
original case. Like Earl Washington's,235 the defendants' convictions
rested largely upon a retracted confession, obtained after repeated
police questioning and corroborated by little other evidence.
Nevertheless, I wondered as I drafted a memorandum summarizing
the events leading to the erroneous convictions, would I have
done anything differently? I do not purport to have the answer to
that question today, but I do know that it was a valid question to
ask myself then and, more importantly, a question that ethical
prosecutors themselves need to raise in daily practice.
This Article has attempted to explore how cognitive bias might
trigger poor decision making by prosecutors who intend to do
justice. By doing so, this Article seeks to complement rather than
supplant the vast literature that treats prosecutors as rational
actors who choose to engage in misconduct. Adding a cognitive
dimension to the current discussion of prosecutorial decision
making is important in two different ways.
First, it shapes the direction of reform. Although sanctions and
other alterations of the prosecutorial cost-benefit analysis may
deter wrongful conduct in prosecutors who are not motivated to do
justice, a cognitive explanation for how even virtuous prosecutors
might contribute to wrongful convictions suggests that good values
are not enough. As an admittedly introductory effort, this Article
sets forth a few suggestions for enhancing neutral decision making
by ethical prosecutors.
Moving beyond fault-based rhetoric to include a cognitive view of
prosecutorial decision making also establishes a necessary discur-
sive shift in the important, ongoing study of wrongful convictions.
Using only the language of fault in the discussion invites an
adversarial relationship between prosecutors and advocates for the
innocent, because prosecutors naturally resist their depiction as
wrongdoers. By antagonizing prosecutors and creating an opposing
political force, the language of fault impairs the chances for
meaningful prosecutor-initiated reforms, such as internal review
235. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10 for a discussion of the Earl Washington case.
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committees 236 or office guidelines to improve the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
237
In contrast, a cognitive explanation for faulty prosecutorial
decision making creates the potential to fold ethical prosecutors
into the dialogue. This discursive shift may encourage ethical
prosecutors to examine the danger that they might personally
contribute to wrongful convictions. Only when that happens can
ethical prosecutors improve the quality of their own decisions and
attempt to implement reforms that might improve the prosecutorial
decision making of others.
236. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the power to
improve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion through review committees within district
attorneys' offices.
237. Many have suggested that internal guidelines may be one of the most effective
methods of improving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Norman Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57
(1971); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1562 (1981).
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